Abstract-The electric power grid is owned and operated by many competing providers who do not want to reveal their sensitive information to other providers. This competitive environment motivates the use of a third-party (cloud-computing) platform that combines information from each provider and jointly optimizes resources in the entire grid. Since the power system structure and component values are confidential, the third-party computing platform must be either absolutely secure or information needs to be masked before sharing with the third party. In this paper, we propose an approach to obfuscate the sensitive information and solve the multi-party AC optimal power flow problem in a shared computing platform. The initial obfuscation is separately performed by each party so that sensitive information is masked from the third party and all other participants.
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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE ELECTRIC power grid is a critical infrastructure that is vulnerable to physical and cyber attacks [11] , [13] , [14] , [16] , [19] , [29] . For security, it is important to minimize access to power flow models. For economic competitiveness, the market participants are not inclined to share their sensitive information with other participants. Motivated by this need for increased cyber-physical security and economic confidentiality, this paper proposes techniques to obfuscate sensitive information in power optimization system models without jeopardizing the quality of the solutions obtained from such models.
In [3] and [4] , we proposed a solution approach to hide sensitive structural information in the single party DC Optimal Power Flow (DCOPF) problems. The DCOPF is usually formulated as an optimization problem with linear constraints and either a linear or quadratic objective. In our approach, the power system operator first obfuscates all the sensitive model information by applying a linear transformation that preserves the sparsity of the underlying formulation. The transformed problem is then sent to shared-computing platform such as a cloud computer for solving [15] . We argue that only the power system operator has the ability to recover the sensitive information from either the transformed problem and/or its solution. The solution is transferred back to power system operator who then applies a decipher transformation to recover the optimal solution to the original problem. We also showed that there is not much increase in the time required to solve the optimization.
In this paper, we focus on the nonlinear AC Optimal Power Flow (ACOPF) problem with simultaneous multi-party obfuscation. Unlike the DCOPF, the constraints and the objective in ACOPF are non-linear and the feasible region in ACOPF is usually non-convex [17] , [18] . The coupled multiparty setting of our problem further motivates the need for third-party shared computing. In this setting each party will mask their own system models and parameters, and the third party will combine and solve the overall system model. To do this, we develop new methods to simultaneously accommodate the need for privacy of sensitive information while jointly solving the ACOPF problem. A preliminary presentation of the masking technique is found in [28] which considered a single-party model. Here we examine the more important multi-party problem, and apply different algorithmic techniques to enhance computational performance.
A multi-party structure already exists in the present power grid managed by Independent System Operators that manage transmission-coupled supply and distribution companies. Emerging smart grid trends include Distribution System Operators (DSO) that will coordinate the operation of coupled micro-grids, and interface with a larger grid. The individual micro-grids will likewise value privacy and security. The multi-party obfuscation techniques developed in this paper will enable providers to preserve their sensitive information while allowing joint optimal operation of coupled grids and micro-grids.
There is extensive research on encryption techniques for exchanging information between two parties that prevents an eavesdropping third-party from deciphering the information [12] . These techniques require "decryptionbefore-use", i.e., the receiving party must first decrypt the encrypted information before it can make use of the information. These techniques are useful but not exactly suitable to our purpose because we do not want to decrypt the individual ACOPFs before solving the optimization problem.
More recently, there has been considerable progress on homomorphic encryption schemes where one can evaluate a function directly on the encrypted inputs to obtain encrypted results [10] , [20] , [25] . These techniques are useful for offloading computations to a third-party without revealing sensitive information; the offloading party encrypts the inputs and also decrypt the results. Although our work is inspired by this body of research, we do not use any homomorphic encryption techniques from literature because solving the optimization problem on homomorphically encrypted data is computationally very expensive [7] . Furthermore, these encryption schemes are not designed to hide sensitive electric grid information such as network topology, power generator limits, and line limits.
Secure multi-party computation techniques permit multiple parties to jointly evaluate a function without revealing each other's inputs to the other parties [1] , [2] , [5] , [27] . One commonly used approach involves encrypting the function as a garbled logic circuit such that the output of the garbled circuit on encrypted inputs from all the parties is the output of the function [1] , [30] . Our solution is a tailored realization of the secure multi-party computation for ACOPF problem. We specifically tailor the multi-party computation to ensure desirable properties such as preserving optimality and making efficient use of communication and storage resources.
There is also a body of research based on the notion of differential privacy. The idea was originally introduced in the context of databases where the objective is to prevent leakage of sensitive information in query responses [8] . The solution approaches for differential privacy perturb the database records to either ensure k-anonymity where an attacker can, at best, associate sensitive information to one of k possible records or they are designed to provide approximate, but statistically accurate, query results. In this paper, we do not consider privacy approaches that provide approximate but statistically accurate solutions. Instead, our goal is to preserve the optimality of the solution, i.e., the power flow solution from the privacy-aware approach must be equivalent to the solution from a traditional non-privacy aware ACOPF solver. Notions of k-anonymity may be useful in preserving the privacy of the grid topology. We take a different approach for preserving privacy of grid topology.
There are privacy solutions in the context of distributed controls. For instance, in [24] , differential privacy approach prevents leakage of sensitive input information based on observation of the unencrypted outputs in a distributed control system. In contrast, in our approach, the outputs (i.e., solution of the optimization problem) remain obfuscated in such a way that each party can only unmask its part of the overall solution. Preserving the privacy of the solutions of the optimization is critical in the ACOPF context. Hence, we pursue solution approaches that preserve of the optimization outputs in the sense that each provider can only de-obfuscate his/her part of the solution. Furthermore, neither an eavesdropper nor the third-party that solved the optimization formulation can knowingly recover the solution corresponding to any provider. As a tradeoff, the optimization problem we solve does not retain the structure of ACOPF. Furthermore, there is also some degradation in the level of sparsity; albeit the amount of degradation can be controlled to some extent. As a result of these tradeoffs, the time required to solve the obfuscated optimization problem may be larger than that required for standard ACOPF.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we generalize the basic model in [28] and extend it to the multi-party scenario. We describe the basic obfuscation technique in Section III. In Section IV we describe approaches to significantly reduce the computational and storage demand of the basic obfuscation technique. Privacy analysis is presented in Section V and an empirical evaluation of our approach on a two-party 30-bus power system is presented in Section VI. The paper concludes in Section VII.
II. MULTI-PARTY AC OPF MODEL
In this section, we develop the multi-party AC optimal power flow (AC OPF) model. For instance, Figure 1 shows a scenario where the electric grid is owned and managed in part by two different parties. In this figure, the part of the grid containing buses 1-11 and 24-30 is owned and managed by one party while the remaining part containing buses 12-23 is owned and managed by the second party. For simplicity of presentation, we refer to the portion of the grid owned by party i as Area-i. To reduce the need to share information between connected areas, we introduce two fictitious buses on the transmission lines that connect a bus from one area to other. For instance, Figure 2 depicts a transmission between Area-1 and Area-2. We introduce two fictitious buses M and N in the shared transmission line K and divide it into three sub-lines a, b and c. The new Area-1 includes bus M' and subline a, while the new Area-2 includes bus N and sub-line c. Although these fictitious buses and sub-lines are not needed to model multi-party AC OPF, it is convenient for modeling purpose to include bus M and sub-line a in Area-1 and bus N and sub-line c in Area-2 and eliminate sharing of any direct information between the two areas.
Let [n] denote the set of natural numbers less than or equal to n, i.e., {1, 2, . . . , n}. Further, let m denote the total number of parties involved in the grid. Let the subscript i indicate the i-th party. Let n bi , n lni , n gi and n ldi respectively denote the number of the buses, transmission lines, generator buses and load buses in Area-i, i ∈ [m]. Define N csi as the number of the constraints and N vi as the number of the variables (including the slack ones). These quantities can vary on different AC OPF representations. The exact formulae of them in our model are specified in the Appendix I. Further, let x i ∈ N vi denote the vector of variables corresponding to Area-i consisting of bus voltages in rectangular coordinates, active and reactive generations, and slack variables. Let SB ij denote set of shared (fictitious) buses between Area-i and Area-j. Define a sharing matrix e T ij of dimension |SB ij | × N vi containing 0's and 1's. Each row of e T ij has exactly one 1 corresponding to a voltage variable on one of the shared fictitious buses between Area-i and Area-j. We start with the multi-party AC OPF model in the normalized form. The derivation of this form is discussed in the Appendix I, and can also be found in [28] .
where
×N vi are symmetric matrices, the values of i,k i 's are either 0 or 1 depending on the constant terms of the constraints: they are 0 for the zero constant terms and 1 for the nonzero constants.
III. CONVERTING AC OPF MODELS INTO LEAST SQUARE FORMULATION
To mask the confidential information of AC OPF model in Equation (1), each party individually transforms its constraints and cost function into a new formulation. It then sends the transformed model to the cloud where these models are assembled and solved together as a least squares problem (See Figure 3) .
Step 1: For each party i, find a constant matrix T i , which is called the transformation matrix, and a constant vector γ i , called the encryption vector, such that
To ensure that every feasible point x i is accessible, T i must have full row rank, which further requires that N ci ≥ N vi . The purpose of the encryption vector γ i is to mask the solution of the original problem, which will be discussed in Section V. Such T i and γ i are not unique. Each party can generate its own T i and γ i . The specific one we used for the simulations is described in [28] .
Step 2: Substituting Equation (2) in Equation (1), the feasibility constraints, denoted by f i,k i (β i ), can be written as
, and taking a linear combination of f i (β i ), we can rewrite Equation (3) as Feasibility Const.:
where R i ∈ N csi ×N csi is a nonsingular sparse matrix whose entries are non-negative. Equation (4) will serve as our refined feasibility constraints in the rest of the paper.
The new linking constraints are
Assembling all the parties' constraints, we can re-write Equation (1) as
Subject to :
Step 3: Using the Lagrangian multipliers, the first order necessary conditions for each area can be written as
e ij μ i,j = 0
where λ i and μ i,j are the Lagrangian multipliers to the feasibility constraints of Equation (4) and the linking constraints of Equation (5) respectively. Denote the column vector of all the μ i,j 's over the index j as μ i .
Since the γ i is a known vector, the unknowns in Equation (4), (5), and (7) are the β i and the Lagrangian multipliers λ i and μ i . Stacking these unknowns into a vector and stacking over all the parties, define ζ = . . .
We can stack all the equations from Equation (4), (5) and (7) in a column, denoted by h(ζ ), over all the areas. Denote the dimension of h(ζ ) as N h . Since these equations are quadratic polynomials with respect to ζ , they can be expressed generally in the form of
is the linear term vector and r k ∈ is the constant term. In this section, these H k , P k and r k are the information needed for the cloud computing and will be sent to the cloud in concept. (See Section IV for more condensed form)
Step 4: Summing up the square of every equation from h(ζ ), the unconstrained least square problem equivalent to Equation (8) is
Step 5: Compute the gradient and the Hessian of R(ζ ) for the Hessian-based algorithm to solve Equation (9) in the cloud. The Jacobian matrix of h(ζ ) with respect to ζ is
Then, the gradient of R(ζ ) is
The Hessian of R(ζ ) after dropping the residue term [23] is
Step 6: Using Equations (11) and (12), solve Equation (9) in the cloud to obtain the solutions β * i , λ * i , and μ * i . Each party i then independently obtains its first order necessary solution x * i via Equation (2).
IV. IMPROVING COMPUTATIONAL EFFICIENCY OF MULTI-PARTY AC OPF MODEL The formulation presented in the previous section masks an ACOPF problem by the transformation matrix T i in Equation (2) and the linear combination matrix R i in Equation (4) . As written, it suffers from computational challenges. In particular, in the least squares formulation, each party must communicate H k , a large, full matrix for every constraint. The amount of data describing the overall model is immense, and needs to be simplified. To this end, we return to the original problem to exploit the low-rank properties of the matrices in the constraint equations.
The power flow constraints shown in Equation (1) are abstracted and normalized. They do not immediately reveal any structure or form. Importantly, all the M i,k i matrices are very sparse and very low rank. The sparsity is potentially lost during the masking process, a cost we accept for obscuring the model, however, the low rank is preserved. For example, regardless of the size of the system, the rank of the M i,k i matrices will not exceed 6. Although we apply a linear combination of some constraints to obscure the rank, it can still be kept low by the sparsity of the matrix R i . Consider that each of the symmetric M i,k i matrices can be written as
where the subscript "R" indicated reduced; i.e., V Ri,k i only contains eigenvectors associated with nonzero eigenvalues. On the right hand side of Equation (13) we incorporate the values of the eigenvectors via multiplying the eigenvectors by the square root of the associated eigenvalues. To accommodate negative eigenvalues, we negate one of the vectors. For those eigenvalues that are positive, v − = v + = √ λv. For those eigenvalues that are negative, v − = −v + = − √ λv. The matrices V +i,k i and V −i,k i may not be sparse, but they are very low rank, and one of their dimensions will be equal to the rank. We describe these matrices as "rank-dimensioned" matrices. This very low rank property is preserved by the masking transformation of Equation (2) .
Before presenting the form of the relevant transformed equations, we pause to mention that we do not perform a computational eigenvalue decomposition for each constraint to obtain the eigenvectors and eigenvalues in Equation (13) . Instead we use a simple closed-form description of the eigenvalues and eigenvectors for the power flow equation constraint matrices in rectangular coordinates [9] . For the interested reader, an example is presented in the Appendix II for an active power constraint.
Starting from Equation (1) and tracing through the transformations in the previous section, we can express the feasibility, the linking, and the first-order constraints of Equations (4), (5), and (7) in terms of rank-dimensioned matrices, dramatically reducing the size of the system representation in terms of storage. Each entry of Equation (4) can be written in the quadratic form in terms of β i
is a vector, and U −i,k i and U +i,k i are rank-dimensioned matrices that we will define shortly below.
The linking constraint of Equation (5) can be expressed as
where t ij , t ji , r ijs and r jis are low-dimensional matrices and vectors depending on the number of the transmission lines between areas, and are defined below.
Finally the vector of the first-order constraints described in Equation (7) can be written as
The scalars and the rank-dimensioned vectors and matrices in Equations (14), (15), and (16) are listed below. Using (14) and (16) are unaffected by the use of these unitary matrices. As shown in Figure 4 , the low rank matrices, vectors and scalars
, and r ijs are sent to the cloud and a least-square algorithm is used to solve Equations (14), (15) , and (16).
It's useful to compare how system models scale with the number of buses, generators, and lines, and we can estimate the memory required for the matrices of the dense system model of Section III and the rank-dimensioned matrices of this section. We can also compute these for the original model in Equation (1) for reference, however for that system the sparse representation will be best and nearly negligible in size.
Let N ri be the total rank of all the constraints; masked,full be the total number of the elements in the matrices used in Equation (8); and masked,rank be the total number of the elements in the rank-dimensioned matrices presented in this section. Then masked,full appears to be O(N 3 ) while Modified least square formulation with significantly reduced computational and storage demands. masked,rank is comparably O(N 2 ). For example, let R i be a monomial matrix, then
The total number of the elements in the rank-dimensioned matrices is much smaller and approximated by masked,rank = 2N ci N ri (19) For the 30-bus example presented in Section VI, the amount of data sent to the cloud using the rank-dimensioned matrices is 0.3% of the data required using the full matrices. For comparison we can compute the equivalent memory requirements for the open, untransformed model of Equations (1): (20) open,rank = N vi N ri (21) From Equations (18)- (21) and the definitions provided in Section II, the transformation increases the storage requirements by a factor of roughly 36 for the full, dense models, and by a factor of roughly 5 for the rank-dimensional representations. These results are discussed more with respect to the results presented in Section VI.
V. PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In this section we will discuss the security issues at three different levels. Before that, we need first answer a question: What kinds of information need to be obfuscated?
The first and foremost security concern comes from protecting the power grid safety against malicious attacks. Reference [6] indicates that if the topology of the network and some actual values of the operating units are revealed, an adversary may be capable of finding the most vulnerable parts of the grid. This may enable the adversary to design malicious controls and attacks to the actual system, causing power blackout and equipment damage. Thus the network topology and its parameter values should be kept confidential. The other concern originates from the competitive commercial activities. The power market participants are unwilling to share their commercial information to each other. Henceforth the solution to each participant should be hidden from others. Consequently, the network topology, the power grid parameter values and the solutions to the original OPF problems should be obfuscated.
At the first of the three security levels we analyze some special information from the cloud data under the assumption that the adversary is educated with the general AC OPF models but has no specific knowledge about the area he is attacking. We call this situation the "blind attack". At the second level we assume that the attacker not only is educated with the general model but also applies the correct topology information of the area in his attack to identify the parameter values of the original system. We call this situation the "knowledgeable attack". Finally we assume that the attacker has acquired the topology and the parameter values of the grid, but no exact knowledge of the linear combinations. We are interested in whether he can recover the AC OPF solution from the cloud. We call it the "solution attack".
A. Security Analysis of Blind Attacks
Suppose the adversary has the full authority to access all the uploaded data of the i-th party from the cloud, i.e., U +i,k i ,
and r ijs . And suppose he is welleducated with the general AC OPF models but has no specific knowledge about the grid of this area, say, no knowledge of the topology and the parameter values. The first concern is whether the rank information of the original constraints in Equation (3) of the i-th party is deducible from the cloud. If this information is revealed, then through a combinatorial search the topology may be identified.
Recall in Equation (4) that we combine a small portion of the feasibility constraints for each feasibility equation. The purpose of this refinement is to obscure the special rank information of each original feasibility equations. The exact rank information can be revealed if and only if the original uncombined matrices in Equation (3) are known, which requires the exact knowledge of R i . Since R i is kept private individually by party i, the rank information can also be kept private from the cloud. The difficulty in recovering R i comes from the following observations:
1. The number of the choices of the nonzero structure of R i is huge. For example, suppose R i has a certain structure that each row only has three nonzero elements including one of them on the diagonal, then the total number of the possible
2. There is no other information to check if a guess of the structure of R i is correct in the blind attacks.
3. Even with the correct guess of the structure of R i , the value of each nonzero element in R i also needs to be identified. This is shown to be hard in the discussion of solution attacks in Section V-B.
Note that the linear combination may increase the rank of each constraint but can be controlled by the sparsity of R i .
It is a tradeoff between the complexity and the security. One of our future areas of research is to investigate low rank conditions with a certain level of security.
On the other hand, the adversary can always try to break up U +i,k i and U −i,k i into its components, i.e., u i,k i , +i,k i , −i,k i and T i . The difficulty of recovering u i,k i , +i,k i , −i,k i and T i follows from the observation that there are uncountably many matrices of u i,k i , +i,k i , −i,k i and T i that satisfy
and T * i satisfy Equation (22), we can choose any arbitrary unitary matrix u and any arbitrary invertible matrix A such that
It indicates that one specific solution induces a family of uncountably many solutions which obscures the correct one. Therefore, in the blind attack scenario, even with the complete obfuscated data of an area, the essential information will be safe.
B. Security Analysis of Knowledgeable Attacks
Suppose the adversary has the full authority to access all the uploaded data of the i-th party from the cloud, i.e., U +i,k i , U −i,k i , etc. And suppose he is well-educated with the general AC OPF models. Furthermore, he knows the exact topology of the area grid, and successfully decoupled the linear combination of each constraint, however he achieves it. Can he decrypt the parameter values of the original model?
First of all, to apply the topological information in the attack, the adversary has to recover the quadratic matrices of area i in Equation (8) 
Since U +i,k i and U −i,k i are known, H i,ki is known. Suppose all the R i (k i , l i )'s are known, the correct grid topology information can reveal the structure of the nonzero elements of M i,k i , but the values of them are kept unknown. And T i is unknown.
Solving the cubic matrix Equation (24) is equivalently to solve a set of cubic equations for every element in H i,ki .
where H i,ki (m, n) is the (m, n)-th entry of H i,ki , ζ is the unknowns of T i and M i,k i , and τ k i ,mn (ζ ) is the corresponding cubic equation.
Since this set of equations is over-determined, it can be formulated as a least square problem by summing up all the squares of the cubic equations into a sixth-order multivariable polynomial.
Minimize L(ζ
We claim that under the assumption of correct topology guess, the actual values of the original power grid can be decrypted only if Equation (26) reaches its global optimality. Note that plugging the actual values of the grid in Equation (26) will drive it to zero, which is the global optimality. Thus the necessary condition holds. However, since Equation (26) is a sixth-order multivariable polynomial, it is generically non-convex, hence solving Equation (26) is NPhard [21] , [22] even without the global optimality requirement. Furthermore, the dimension of Equation (26) is N vi × N ci + K × N csi , where K is a scalar depend on the network topology. The dimension increases quadratically with the increase of the power grid scale. For example, in our 30-bus simulation case the first party consists of 18 buses and 26 transmission lines. The dimension of Equation (26) to this single party is over 44,000. When consider the 30-bus system as a whole, the dimension increases to over 156,000.
In the knowledgeable attack scenario, with the help of correct topological information, it is theoretically possible to decrypt the sensitive information from the cloud data but computationally difficult in practice, especially for a large system.
C. Security Analysis of Solution Attacks
Suppose the adversary has obtained the original data of the i-th area, i.e., the topology and the parameter values. We also provide him with the nonzero structure of the linear combination matrix R i . Can he recover the solution to the original AC OPF problem?
Recall Equation (2) we have
To obtain x * i the adversary needs the exact information of both the vector x 0 * i = T i β * i and the encryption vector γ i . Let's further suppose that vector x 0 * i is already known, then the only part remains to be decrypted is the encryption vector γ i . With all the assumptions hold, we claim that the encryption vector γ i can be solved only if the following problem is solved
where R i (k i , l i ) and γ i are the unknowns. Note that the actual R i (k i , l i ) and γ i is one particular solution to Equation (28) , then the necessary condition holds. However, solving Equation (28) does not necessarily identify the actual value of γ i since it generically has infinitely many solutions. Suppose the linear combination matrix R i has a minimal number of nonzero elements that keeps it nonsingular, then the number of R i (k i , l i )'s is N csi . So the cardinality of the unknowns is N csi + N vi , greater than the number of the equations which is 2N csi . It implies that if Equation (28) is solvable, it has infinitely many solutions which obscure the actual one. So without the exact knowledge of the encryption vector γ i , the original solution x * i remains private. The analysis of the above three security levels is summarized in Table I . 
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
Here we provide a 30-bus system example depicted in Figure 5 . The circles with G's inside represent the buses with generators; the triangles represent the buses with loads; and the heavy dots represent the buses with neither generators nor load. This system has two areas, shown in different colors. Area-1 in purple contains sixteen buses from Bus-1 to Bus-16 and twenty-two transmission lines; Area-2 in green contains fourteen buses from Bus-21 to Bus-34 and eighteen transmission lines. These two areas are connected by two interconnection transmission lines in orange, one of which links Bus-3 to Bus-32, and another links Bus-16 to Bus-21. To further separate two areas, we add fictitious Bus-17, Bus-18, Bus-19 and Bus-20 on the interconnection transmission lines and divide each of them into three sub-lines. Note that the fictitious buses have neither generators nor loads.
Suppose Area-1 with fictitious Bus-17 and Bus-18 are operated by Party-1, while Area-2 with fictitious Bus-19 and Bus-20 are operated by Party-2. We follow our previous discussion to obtain the private transformations, then obfuscate each party's model separately by converting the AC OPF model to the least square formulation, and finally solve all of them jointly. The construction of the transformation matrices T i 's in the simulation is discussed in Appendix I. For easy demonstration, we choose the linear combination matrix R i to be monomial.
To mimic the loads changing, we increase the load demands on Bus-4, Bus-5, Bus-6, Bus-23 and Bus-29 simultaneously for seventy-five different cases. In each case, we choose the starting point to be the solution of the previous case and run the dog-leg algorithm to solve the least square problem. These results are verified using Matpower 5.0 [26] with the Figure 6 . We can see that the first few steps are profoundly efficient, converging from 10 4 to 10 −6 within three iterations. However, as the load demands increase, it becomes difficult to reduce the least square function value to below 10 −7 . This is attributed to a large condition number of T i matrix. In our example, the condition number T i is around 100. There are several possible ways to reduce this condition number. Exploring these options is part of our ongoing research.
Next we compare the memory requirements for the example represented in the unmasked form of Equation (1), the masked system with full, dense matrices of Section III, and the rank-dimensioned matrices of Section IV. The memory needs are estimated by counting the total number entries in the matrices and vectors and multiplying by 64 bits (i.e., 8 bytes) for double precision. In practice a certain amount of additional reduction may be possible with efficient compression and coding. The results are shown below in Table II . The unmasked, sparse system uses negligible memory for this example. We also calculate the size required if the matrices were full and dense, and using the rank-dimension representation for comparison. Sparsity is clearly lost in the transformation. The rank-dimension representation is roughly 40 times larger than the sparse representation for the unmasked model, and the masking increases the size by roughly a factor of 5. This rank-dimension representation is dramatically lower than the full, dense matrix representation. Further research on transformations that offer sparsity in the rank-dimensioned representation is warranted.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper continues our previous work in [28] , focusing on multi-party applications, computational aspects, and security analysis.
The proposed obfuscation strategy transforms an ACOPF into a least squares problem that is suitable for cloud computing. In this transformation, there is a loss of sparsity of several key matrices, but the low rank properties of the matrices are retained. We exploit the low rank properties to reduce the computation and storage demands of the transformed problem. Although the demands are larger than that of the original unobfuscated sparse ACOPF problem, it is well-suited for the solution through the parallel computing of a cloud computing platform. The privacy analysis discusses three levels of data security issues and shows that it is computationally hard to decrypt the masked data.
Future investigations will be exploring the possibility of preserving sparsity of the transformed problem, keeping the low rank of the linearly combined constraints with the certain level of security, and reducing the condition number of the transformation matrix.
APPENDIX I
This appendix serves as a review of our previous work [28] to explain some important derivations for the paper. Without loss of generality, we consider the model for the i-th party. All the other parties construct their models similarly.
Consider the power system of the i-th area. Denote n bi , n lni , n gi and n ldi as the number of the buses, the number of the transmission lines, the number of the generators and the number of the loads in this area (the same notation as in Section II). Without loss of generality, let the buses from the 1 st to the n gi -th to be generators. A classical AC OPF model for this area is described as
Current Limits: 
− to represent the negative range. Next, introduce non-negative slack variables to the inequality constraints, making them equalities. Since these slack variables are non-negative, we can always express them in terms of the squares of some other variables. For instance, the power injection upper bound inequality
Rewrite every constraint in this form, Equation (29) can be modified as
Minimize p
Power Balance:
out,j,max , m = 1, 2, . . . , n bi k = 1, 2, . . . , n gi j = 1, 2, . . . , n lni (30) Note that the left hand side of each constraint is homogeneous, while the right hand side is a constant. We normalize each constraint by dividing its right hand side constant if nonzero. The normalization obscures the information of the load demands and the engineering limits. We align all the variables (including the slack variables) in to a single column vector k is either 1 or 0 depending on the constant term of the k-th constraint.
Once we consider the multi-party scenario, we add the subscript i to distinguish different parties, which coincides with the notation in Equation (1) in Section II.
Note that once we solve the first order necessary condition of Equation (32), we still need to check the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for the Lagrangian multipliers on the original inequality constraints.
APPENDIX II
In this appendix we highlight the result that provides a closed form decomposition to eigenvalues and eigenvectors of a power flow constraint matrix in rectangular coordinates. We show the specific result for an active power injection constraint, and refer the reader to [9] for details about a general result that applies to power flow model constraints. We inherit the same notations from Appendix II except that j for √ −1. In rectangular coordinates, the active power injection at bus m is related to the bus voltages by 
Matrix F m is symmetric, sparse, and has rank 4. There are a two pairs of repeated eigenvalues, one pair is positive and the other pair is negative. The (non-unique) eigenvectors for the repeated pairs take the form
which can be verified by direct substitution in Equation (36). That is, if v 1 is an eigenvector of F m , then v 2 is also an eigenvector. The closed-form solution for the eigenvalues of F m is
The corresponding eigenvectors are not unique. One pair in the form shown in Equation ( 
